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I. Introduction 
The performance of investment recommenda- 
tions has been studied at great length. Most of 
this research has focused on equities recom- 
mended by securities analysts (Groth et al. 1978, 
1979; Stanley, Lewellen, and Schlarbaum 1981; 
Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1983). A 
number of these studies have evaluated the per- 
formance of Value Line, a well-known invest- 
ment advisory service. The results of Black 
(1973), Holloway (1981), Copeland and Mayers 
(1982), Stickel (1985), Huberman and Kandel 
(1987, 1990), Lee and Park (1987), Peterson 
(1987), and Hall and Tsay (1988) have shown that 
Value Line stock rankings have significant in- 
formation content and that abnormal returns 
We extend the research 
on the Value Line 
Enigma by examining 
the performance of call 
recommendations in 
Value Line Options. 
Galai's hedge decompo- 
sition procedure identi- 
fies the components of 
the calls' returns. Ab- 
normal call returns 
were most pronounced 
immediately following 
the purchase, which is 
consistent with studies 
of Value Line's stock 
rankings. The largest 
and most significant ab- 
normal performance 
was by calls assigned 
the highest rank writ- 
ten on stocks judged 
by Value Line to be 
correctly priced. Ab- 
normal call return per- 
formance by joint call 
and stock ranks was 
consistent with the hy- 
pothesis that Value 
Line identifies un- 
derpriced call options. 
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might be possible for investors using the service. These findings have 
often been referred to as the "Value Line Enigma." 
Value Line's stock recommendations are published in its Value Line 
Investment Survey. In addition, Value Line provides option recom- 
mendations in its Value Line Options. Both are published the first four 
Mondays of the month. A natural extension of tests of the "Value 
Line Enigma" with respect to equities is the examination and testing 
of option recommendations. The question is interesting in its own 
right, given the dearth of studies on the performance of option recom- 
mendations. However, since the recommendations are made by Value 
Line, with its well-documented history of superior stock recommenda- 
tions, the question is even more interesting. Call (put) options can 
perform well because the underlying stocks perform well (poorly) and/ 
or because the options are mispriced. Thus, if Value Line's option 
recommendations perform well, it will be necessary to identify whether 
the superior performance is simply a leveraging of the performance of 
Value Line's stock selections or whether Value line truly has the abil- 
ity to identify options mispriced with respect to the stock. 
This research has two specific objectives, which parallel the two 
major objectives of previous research on Value Line's stock rankings 
and recommendations: (1) to determine whether there is information 
in Value Line's option rankings and recommendations, and (2) to de- 
termine whether an investor following Value Line's option recommen- 
dations and prescribed strategy earns abnormal returns. To accomplish 
the first objective, we examine the impact of option recommendations 
on option returns around the recommendation dates. In addition, we 
analyze the relationship between option performance and option rank 
and the combined option and stock ranking. In pursuing the second 
objective, we examine the performance of option recommendations 
over holding periods defined by Value Line itself. 
Our study focuses on recommendations to buy call options. Call 
buying, as opposed to put buying or combination strategies; is by far 
the largest single category of recommendations, and calls are well 
known to lead puts in volume. Although there may be some interest 
in examining other strategies, the recommendations are not available 
on computer disks or tape and had to be collected by hand. In addition, 
each recommendation has to be monitored every week thereafter. 
Thus, the time and expense of collecting and monitoring recommenda- 
tions for puts and less popular option strategies would have been sub- 
stantial and we deemed that their investigation should be left for future 
research. 
This article is divided into five sections. Section II describes the 
methodology and the issues involved in testing the recommendations. 
Section III describes the data set and provides a summary of the char- 
acteristics of the sample. Section IV presents the results, and Section 
V contains a summary and our conclusions. 
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II. Methodology and Procedural Issues 
A. Value Line Options 
Each issue of Value Line Options contains two sections, the "Option 
Strategist" section and the "Option Evaluation" section. Value Line 
employs a ranking system with options ranked from 1 to 5, where 1 is 
the highest ranking and 5 is the lowest. This is the same ranking system 
Value Line uses to rank stocks. The Option Strategist recommends a 
group of options for each of the strategies of naked call buying, naked 
call writing, naked put buying, naked put writing, and covered call 
writing. These options are a subset of all options evaluated and are 
considered to be those most highly recommended. For example, op- 
tions recommended for naked call buying are ranked 1 and their under- 
lying stocks are ranked 1, 2, or 3, with 1 being the highest stock rank 
and 3 being the middle stock rank. Value Line provides a set of seven 
stock prices and an associated option price for each. The subscriber 
is instructed to execute the transaction if the option can be obtained 
at a price equal to or less than the one associated with the current 
stock price.' Consider the following recommendation on September 
12, 1983, for the IBM October 110 call: 
Stock Price 118.00 120.00 121.00 121.88 122.00 123.00 125.00 
Option Price 10.61 12.14 12.92 13.63 13.73 14.54 16.23 
The "recent stock price" was 121.88. The subscriber is instructed 
to determine the current stock price, locate it in the above table or 
interpolate, and buy the call if it can be obtained for an amount less 
than or equal to the indicated price. Thus, these call prices can be 
viewed as limit prices contingent on the stock price. Once purchased, 
the subscriber is advised to monitor the rank of the option in the 
Option Evaluation section of subsequent issues and to sell when the 
rank falls to 3 or below. While the Option Evaluation section is primar- 
ily used for monitoring the option ranks, it contains additional informa- 
tion including the stock rank and Value Line's opinion of the "normal" 
price of the option, which is based upon the recent stock price and 
the time to expiration from the publication date. The normal price 
is tantamount to Value Line's conditional estimate of the option's 
equilibrium value. Value Line uses a proprietary option pricing 
model. 
1. Obviously, with only seven stock prices, some interpolation is necessary. Value 
Line indicates that its choice of the seven stock prices is based on what it calls the 
"recent stock price," which is usually the closing stock price (or an estimate thereof) 
for the Tuesday preceding the publication date. In almost all cases, stock prices on the 
Monday issue date are contained within this range. 
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Value Line prepares each issue on the Tuesday before the Monday 
publication date, and the issues are mailed two days later. This creates 
the possibility that an investor could receive the issue on Friday. With 
Saturday mail service available, some investors could receive it on 
Saturday. Most investors should receive theirs by Monday. We as- 
sume that serious users of the service will make arrangements to have 
the issue delivered in time to begin searching for transactions on Mon- 
day morning. Moreover, conversations with Value Line personnel in- 
dicate that they are relatively confident that the issues are in investors' 
hands by Monday morning. 
B. Decomposing the Return on an Option 
It is well known from the theory of option pricing that an option can 
be replicated by an appropriate weighting of positions in the stock and 
a risk-free bond. Boyle and Emanuel (1980), Galai (1983), and Galai 
and Geske (1984) have shown how an option's return can be decom- 
posed into the interest on funds committed, the leveraging of the 
stock's return, any mispricing on the option, and a residual associated 
with adjustment of the hedge at discrete intervals. Here we present a 
summary of the Galai version of the model. Readers unfamiliar with 
the details are referred to Galai's paper. 
Suppose that at time t - 1, an investor establishes a long position 
in a call, which has an actual price of CA 1, and a short position in h 
shares of stock priced at St.- The model price of the call is CM I and 
a continuously adjusted hedge where ht_ = &CM1 lISt_1 should yield 
a risk-free return. If it does not, there is an excess hedge return defined 
as 
RXH, = 
A 
- hR5, - I 1 (er-1), (1) 
where R , is defined as the actual dollar call return, which is the call 
price at t minus the call price at t - 1, Rs, is the dollar return on the 
stock, IA,I is the investment in the hedge, and r is the risk-free rate 
per period. Since we are buying calls and shorting stock, It_- is nega- 
tive. The excess hedge return results from a change in the difference 
between the model and actual call prices over the period t - 1 to t. 
We call this the "call selectivity," which is defined as 
RG- C - CM - (CAt - CM 1) (2) 
where the superscript M refers to the model, or theoretically correct, 
price of the call. 
The actual return on the call can be decomposed as follows: 
A 
= [IA-1 - (CA-1 - CM 1)](er - 1) + hR51 + RG1 + I, (3) 
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where mt results from adjusting the hedge at discrete intervals rather 
than continuously. We shall refer to this as the hedge slippage. The 
components of the return on the call are, thus, the opportunity cost 
on the actual investment in the hedge adjusted for the difference be- 
tween the actual and model call prices, the return on the stock, the 
change in the mispricing on the call and the hedge slippage. If the 
option were correctly priced and the hedge adjusted continuously, the 
return would consist of only the interest on the actual investment and 
the stock return. This highlights the comparability of options and mar- 
gined stock positions. The interest is analogous to margin interest, and 
the hedge ratio reflects the leverage inherent in options. 
There are a number of alternative option performance evaluation 
techniques. Galai and Geske (1984), in addition to illustrating the above 
method, propose a security market line (SML) approach, while Evnine 
and Rudd (1984) develop a multifactor model for option risk adjustment 
in the spirit of the arbitrage pricing theory (APT). While these methods 
have merits of their own, each is subject to potential problems in the 
choice of a market index and the relevant factors that determine asset 
prices, as well as econometric problems in the estimation of APT or 
SML parameters. Galai's hedging decomposition procedure, based as 
it is on option pricing theory, places far fewer restrictions on investor 
preferences than general equilibrium models. Furthermore, equation 
(3) is especially appropriate for evaluating Value Line's option recom- 
mendations. Value Line's stock selection ability should appear in 
hRs,, and its ability to find mispriced options should be manifested in 
RG,. Because the hedging decomposition procedure is based on the 
principle that risk enters the equations only by a failure to adjust the 
hedge continuously, there is no requirement to make a risk adjustment 
to the option returns. Risk is captured by mt. With a synchronized data 
set, the procedure should give reasonable estimates of the performance 
of the calls and their components. We emphasize that investors would 
not necessarily establish risk-free hedges of a long call and a short 
stock. In fact, Value Line recommends that these calls simply be pur- 
chased outright. The hedge procedure is but a convenient methodology 
for decomposing a call's return. Our interest lies in the excess hedge 
returns, RxH,, and, especially, the call selectivity component, RG .2 
2. Relative to RXH,, the call selectivity component, RG, is a more robust measure of 
option performance. The excess hedge return can be written as 
RXH, = RG, + (CM,l - CA i)(er - 1) + t. 
We see from this equation that RXH, will differ from RG, by the amount of interest earned 
on the difference between the model and actual call prices at t - 1 and by the residual 
return associated with the hedge slippage, ,. The interest earned on the call price 
differential is likely to be small in most cases, with the dominant cause of differences 
in the performance measures represented by X,. Because RG, represents the change in 
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Mon, 10 Nov 2014 14:04:05 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
546 Journal of Business 
While Value Line's stock selection ability should appear in hRSt, we 
must recognize that it is not adjusted for risk. In a later section we 
shall discuss the adjustment of the stock component for risk. 
Long call positions may be recommended for the following reasons: 
(1) the underlying stock is undervalued, or (2) the option is underval- 
ued relative to the current stock price, or (3) both 1 and 2. At any 
point in time, an option can be classified along two dimensions: the 
option rank and the stock timeliness rank. Ceteris paribus, the higher 
the stock rank is, the higher the option rank is. It is, therefore, possible 
to develop hypotheses concerning call selectivity and excess hedge 
returns using the joint call and stock ranks. If Value Line is able to 
identify undervalued calls, we would expect that highly ranked calls 
written on nonhighly ranked stocks would exhibit the largest abnormal 
performance. 
C. The Empirical Procedures 
The selection of recommendations. The database, described in the 
following section, contains all quote and trade records on the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) over the period January 1983- 
December 1985. Beginning with the first week during this period, call 
options recommended in the Option Strategist section are screened 
for purchase. The search procedure involved screening all quotes on 
recommended calls and selecting the first quote for a given call in 
which the ask price was at or below the limit price. The search began 
on the Monday publication date and proceeded through the following 
Friday, stopping only when the transaction could be executed and, 
thus, allowing for the possibility that the ask price might never be less 
than or equal to the limit price.3 We considered only quotes between 
10:00 A.M. and 3:00 P.M. central time, which omits the first hour after 
the opening. This gives the market a period of time to adjust to over- 
night information that might cause unusual price behavior. 
the deviation between market and model prices, it is relatively insensitive to systematic 
biases in actual or model call prices. A potential problem with this measure is that if 
the call option is held until expiration, the actual and model call prices must converge 
and result in a positive value of RG,- In the present study, however, none of the options 
are held until expiration. Value Line decreases the ranks of options recommended for 
naked long positions if the actual and model call prices fail to converge and the rank 
reduction will trigger the termination of the option holding period. The measured value 
of RG, will be nonpositive in such cases and accurately reflect the failure of the Value 
Line model. If the actual and model prices do converge, Value Line will lower the 
option rank to reflect the correct market valuation of the option, and a positive value 
of RG, will be measured. 
3. As noted earlier, only seven stock prices are shown by Value Line for each recom- 
mendation. Since the theoretical call price/stock price frontier is convex, linear interpo- 
lation induces a slight bias, which could permit options to be bought at higher than 
justified prices. We expect this bias is very slight, however. Moreover, Value Line 
specifically recommends linear interpolation so it would be inappropriate to test their 
recommendations without following their advice to the letter. 
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In screening recommendations for purchase, we used the actual ask 
quote for the call. Our database, however, did not provide bid-ask 
quotes for the stock. We considered using the method of capturing 
repeated reversions proposed by Bhattacharya (1983) to estimate stock 
bid-ask prices. Unfortunately, that technique results in jettisoning 
transactions with no price change and, thus, could omit many profit- 
able opportunities. We, thus, decided to use the stock transaction price 
and, if it proved subsequently necessary, to adjust the returns by a 
percentage to reflect the stock bid-ask spread. Since we are not com- 
paring stock prices against an equilibrium stock price, the bias of 
choosing transactions on the wrong side of the market (Phillips and 
Smith 1980) is a problem only for the call options since they must be 
executable at or below the limit price. Without the option bid-ask 
prices, we could not obtain the correct set of transactable recommen- 
dations, but, fortunately, our data set permits us to do so and, thus, 
to avoid the bias. 
The hedge procedure. As noted by Galai (1983), the hedge decom- 
position procedure focuses on changes in the difference between mar- 
ket and model prices so that the effect of any systematic mispricing 
by the tested model is largely mitigated. In other words, the procedure 
is designed to detect whether there is a tendency for the market and 
model prices to converge, not whether the model generates prices that 
are unbiased estimates of the observed market price at every moment 
in time. Moreover, since our option sample spans a broad range of 
expirations and degrees of moneyness, any model pricing biases should 
be minor and unrelated to the options' ranks. 
In the present study, the decomposition procedure is a vehicle for 
testing the accuracy of Value Line's (unobserved) option pricing 
model. Under ideal conditions, option prices and hedge ratios from 
the model would be available continuously. These data would then 
be used to determine whether movements in market call prices are 
anticipated by the Value Line model. Unfortunately, model.informa- 
tion is updated only at weekly intervals. In order to adjust the position 
and measure returns at more frequent intervals, it is necessary to con- 
struct a proxy for the Value Line model. 
Because the subject of our tests is an option pricing model that 
cannot be observed, the paramount criterion in selecting a proxy is 
that the selected model generate prices and hedge ratios that conform 
reasonably closely to those published weekly by Value Line. We have 
found that the Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) and MacMillan (1986) 
model (hereafter BWM), which is an analytic approximation for an 
American option, satisfies this criterion. The "normal" call price and 
the "recent stock price," which are reported weekly in the Option 
Evaluation section, represent an equilibrium call price/stock price 
combination from Value Line's unobserved option pricing model. We 
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use the BWM model in conjunction with the normal call and most 
recent stock prices to calculate an implied volatility. This serves as 
our estimate of Value Line's opinion of the standard deviation of the 
stock's return. The model call price and hedge ratio, which is obtained 
by differentiating the BWM formula with respect to the stock price, 
are calculated using this estimate and the current observed stock price. 
For each day up to and including the next issue date of Value Line 
Options, the volatility estimate is used with the observed stock price 
to estimate a model call price and hedge ratio. A new volatility estimate 
is calculated on the next issue date, and this estimate is used for the 
following week. The procedure of using the previous week's volatility 
estimate to calculate an issue date return precludes recording a large 
and positive call selectivity return through a sudden lowering of the 
Value Line volatility parameter on the issue date. The position is held 
until a new issue ranks the option at 3 or below or does not rank the 
option.4 The position is terminated using the first quote after 10:00 
A.M. on the Monday of the rank change. 
In some cases an option we were holding did not have a quote during 
a given day. In those cases we did not record a return for that day. 
On the next day on which a quote was available, we did not, however, 
record a multiday return. Returns were calculated only if observations 
were available on consecutive trading days. 
III. The Data 
Option and stock price data are obtained from the resorted format of 
the Berkeley Options Data Base, which provides a time-stamped rec- 
ord of virtually every option trade and bid-ask quote on the CBOE. 
The risk-free rate is taken as the continuously compounded yield on 
the Treasury-bill with a maturity date closest to the expiration date of 
the option. The Treasury-bill rates were collected from the Wall Street 
Journal and were updated each Monday. Dividend information was 
provided in Value Line Options. 
The tests covered the period 1983-85 and included all issues of 
Value Line Options over that period. There were 12,699 call purchase 
recommendations, ranging from a weekly low of 47 to a weekly high 
of 120. The average number of weekly recommendations was 88. All 
of the recommended calls were ranked 1 at the time of the recommen- 
dation and represent a subset of 27,019 calls ranked 1 over the 3-year 
period. 
Because of the use of the Berkeley Options Data Base, the sample 
was restricted to CBOE options. There were 6,360 CBOE calls recom- 
ended, which is about 50% of all calls recommended.5 The three most 
4. In some cases an option was no longer ranked. We interpreted this as a rank of 
below 2 and thereupon terminated the position. 
5. This is a slightly smaller percentage than the CBOE's market share of about 60%, 
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TABLE 1 Sample Characteristics 
Months 
0-1 1-2 2-3 3-6 6-9 Total 
A. All CBOE recom- 
mendations: 
In-the-money 371 588 443 841 446 2,689 
At-the-money 68 39 51 881 734 1,773 
Out-of-the-money 50 231 244 914 459 1,898 
Total 489 858 738 2,636 1,639 6,360 
M = 1.06, D = 132 
B. All transactable 
recommendations: 
In-the-money 235 286 217 469 255 1,462 
At-the-money 64 59 50 558 439 1,170 
Out-of-the money 28 153 174 585 277 1,217 
Total 327 498 441 1,612 971 3,849 
M = 1.04, D = 130 
C. Stratified random 
sample of transactable 
recommendations: 
In-the-money 32 31 27 46 47 183 
At-the-money 12 6 5 62 83 168 
Out-of-the-money 3 14 20 54 53 144 
Total 47 51 52 162 183 495 
M = 1.04, D = 145 
NOTE.-These totals represent CBOE call options recommended for purchase by Value Line in 
1983-85 (panel A), the subset of that sample that could be purchased by the end of the week of 
publication (panel B), and the final sample, a stratified random sample of the executable transactions 
(panel C). Totals are stratified by moneyness, M,, where M, = S,e- TIXe -rT, where 8 is the dividend 
yield, r is the risk-free rate, X is the exercise price, and T is the time to expiration. In-the-money is 
defined as M, > 1.05, and out-of-the-money is defined as M, < 0.95; D is the average number of 
days to expiration, and M is average moneyness. Number of months is a close approximation based 
on dividing number of days to maturity by average number of days per month. 
heavily represented stocks were IBM (430), General Dynamics (417), 
and Merrill Lynch (410). Summary statistics are presented in panel A 
of table 1. About 42% were in-the-money, about 28% were within 
? 5 percent of at-the-money, and the remaining 30% were out-of-the- 
money. About 41% of the calls had expirations of 3-6 months, and 
about 26% had expirations of 6-9 months. Thus, there is a tendency for 
the recommendations on CBOE calls to be intermediate- to long-term 
options. The average call was 6% in-the-money and expired in 132 
days. 
Of the 6,360 CBOE call recommendations, 3,849, or about 61%, had 
an ask quote at or below the limit price by Friday of the issue week. 
which may suggest that CBOE options are more likely perceived by Value Line to be 
correctly priced. This is an interesting issue itself but one we do not pursue here. 
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Of these transactable recommendations, about 58% were purchased 
on Monday, 20% on Tuesday, 10% on Wednesday, 7% on Thursday, 
and 5% on Friday. Sample characteristics of the executable CBOE 
recommendations are presented in panel B of table 1. The ability to 
execute a trade for the recommended options is apparently not associ- 
ated with any particular sample characteristics. The executable trans- 
actions also tended to be more intermediate to longer-term and in-the- 
money calls. The average call was in-the-money by 4% and had an 
expiration of 130 days. Of these 3,849 calls, over two-thirds were re- 
peat recommendations. That is, the call was recommended in a given 
week and recommended again in the next week or a subsequent week. 
This left only 1,152 unique recommendations. Because of the enor- 
mous data collection requirements involved in monitoring open posi- 
tions, we chose to pare this sample down to a set of 500, which were 
selected using a stratified random sample designed to obtain a distribu- 
tion of moneyness and time to expiration comparable to the full set of 
1,152. In executing the opening transactions, five short-term near-the- 
money options were lost due to nonconvergence of the implied volatil- 
ity routine, leaving a final sample of 495. Sample characteristics of this 
group are presented in panel C of table 1. The final sample seems quite 
representative of the original sample. Calls tended to be intermediate- 
to long-term and in-the-money. By removing repeat recommendations, 
the average maturity will obviously be longer and was here 145 days. 
The average moneyness was about the same as that of the transactable 
recommendations at about 4% in-the-money. An average of less than 
two recommendations were executed on the same day. This is particu- 
larly favorable since it greatly minimizes the possibility that hetero- 
skedasticity/contemporaneous mispricing will bias the results. 
The mean holding period was 97.31 calendar days, and the median 
was 83 calendar days. Over the sample holding periods, these recom-, 
mendations produced over 29,000 daily returns. Because of potential 
extreme errors in the data on the Berkeley options tape, we examined 
a sample of cases in which the market and model prices showed very 
large differences. When the price we had chosen was well out of line 
with the surrounding prices, we replaced it with the next price. 
IV. Empirical Results 
The first part of this section reports the results of our analysis of the 
periods immediately before and after the date on which a Value Line 
subscriber would establish a position. The second part of this section 
evaluates the performance of the call recommendations over the hold- 
ing period specifically recommended by Value Line. As described ear- 
lier, this period begins on purchase of the option at or below the limit 
price and ends when the option is no longer ranked 1 or 2. The third 
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part of this section examines performance according to option rank 
and the combined option and stock rankings. In the fourth part, we 
evaluate the extent to which recommended call options are low priced 
relative to corresponding put options and the underlying stock in the 
period around the recommendation date. We conduct some additional 
tests in the fifth part of this section and conclude with an analysis of 
the underlying stock returns. 
Our return measures are stated in terms of dollars per contract. 
Because of the small size of the initial value of the position, option 
returns are typically expressed in this fashion rather than as percentage 
returns (see, e.g., Galai 1977). Defining returns this way not only re- 
duces skewness in the returns but also facilitates application of the 
per-contract trading costs reported by Phillips and Smith (1980). Be- 
cause we do not anticipate that Value Line's advice will be perverse, 
we conduct one-tailed tests. 
A. Event Time Analysis 
In this section we evaluate the performance of the recommended calls 
in the window beginning 5 trading days prior to establishment of the 
position and extending to 10 trading days afterward. There are two 
important facts to note. First, recall that Value Line subscribers pur- 
chase recommended call options when the market ask price is at or 
below the limit price. This may or may not occur on the Monday 
recommendation date. Thus, we define day 0 as the date on which the 
market ask price satisfies the limit price. Second, the selection crite- 
rion guarantees that we observe a strong positive difference between 
the model and market prices on the day of the purchase. The questions 
of interest are, Is there subsequent convergence of the market and 
model prices and, if so, when does convergence take place? Significant 
convergence would support the notion that Value Line is capable of 
identifying underpriced calls, while lack of convergence would invali- 
date this notion. If Value Line's recommendations have information 
content, then convergence of the market and model prices should oc- 
cur at or shortly after the purchase date. 
Table 2 contains the mean difference between the model call price 
and the average of the bid and ask call prices for each trading day 
during the period beginning 1 week prior to the purchase date and 
ending 2 weeks afterward. We use the average of the bid and ask 
prices to facilitate comparison of returns between days. A graphical 
representation is provided in figure 1. Over the week prior to the pur- 
chase date the mean difference is positive and shows a slight tendency 
to decline. On day 0 (the purchase date) there is a sharp upward spike 
in the difference, averaging about $0.77 per call. This is the signal that 
subscribers act on when following Value Line's recommendations. The 
difference between the model and quote price drops sharply the next 
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TABLE 2 Performance around the Purchase Date 
Day CM - CA RG, 
-5 .537(.036) .981(1.924) 
-4 .504(.033) 2.198(1.738) 
- 3 .484(.030) .852(1.874) 
- 2 .468(.028) - 1.090(1.400) 
- 1 .471(.030) .424(1.965) 
0 .766(.029) - 28.114*(2.621) 
1 .551(.031) 21.222*(2.229) 
2 .530(.032) 2.531(1.705) 
3 .495(.031) 2.470(1.795) 
4 .491(.032) 2.234(2.067) 
5 .442(.032) 6.620*(1.846) 
6 .451(.030) - .416(1.903) 
7 .455(.030) - 1.157(1.406) 
8 .429(.029) 3.992*(1.609) 
9 .410(.029) 1.302(1.528) 
10 .357(.031) 4.407*(1.806) 
NOTE.-These statistics are the sample mean values of the call 
selectivity measure, RGT, and the difference between the market and 
actual prices, CM - CA. Standard errors are in parentheses. The op- 
tion is purchased at the midpoint of the bid-ask spread, and the hedge 
is adjusted daily using the midpoint of the bid-ask spread. All stock 
trades are executed at the stock transaction price. All means are inter- 
preted as dollars per contract. All values for CM - Care significant 
at better than .01. 
* Significant at the .01 level. 
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FIG. 1. -Difference between model price and quote price by day. The graph 
illustrates the average value of the difference by day. Day 0 is the first day of 
the holding period. 
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day to $0.55 and declines steadily over the 2 weeks following the pur- 
chase date. Although only 10 trading days after the purchase are shown 
here, the difference stabilizes at around 30 cents after 20 days. This 
difference of just over 1/4 point is within a transaction cost of the 
Value Line price. 
Table 2 also contains the mean values of the call selectivity compo- 
nent during the event period, while figure 2 provides a graphical repre- 
sentation. Note that positive (negative) values of RG, result from con- 
vergence (divergence) of model and market prices. Thus, consistent 
with the evidence in figure 1, we observe call selectivity returns near 
zero in the week prior to the purchase date. The large negative return 
on the purchase date reflects the divergence of the model and quote 
prices that triggers purchase. The large positive return on the first day 
of the holding period corresponds to the significant convergence of 
model and quote prices evident from figure 1. After day 1, we observe 
positive mean values of RG, on 7 of the 9 event days in the window, 
with 3 of these significant at .01. Although not shown here, the mean 
selectivity return follows a random pattern around zero for the remain- 
der of the holding period. 
There is some concern that dividends around the event date might 
impart a bias to these findings. Dividends and the attendant early exer- 
cise that they sometimes induce could affect these results. We reran 
30 
1o 0 -----------~0------------ - -----------------------------I 20E-d/-1 10 
(I) 
-30 
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 1 0 
Holding Period Day 
FIG. 2.-Call selectivity component by holding period day. The graph illus- 
trates the average value of RG, by each day of the holding period. Day 0 is the 
first day of the holding period. 
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these tests removing all calls in which the stock went ex-dividend 
within 5 days of the purchase date. The results were nearly identical. 
These results seem to indicate that Value Line does provide useful 
information and that most of the information in Value Line's recom- 
mendations is impounded very rapidly into the option's price. Most of 
the convergence between model and quote prices takes place on the 
first day of the holding period. Two weeks after the purchase date, 
mean call selectivity returns are essentially zero. As reported earlier, 
the average length of the holding period was 97.31 days. Thus, it ap- 
pears that Value Line's recommendation to buy is timely, but its rec- 
ommendation to sell is late. Holding the position beyond 2-4 weeks 
is at best a neutral position and ties up funds that might be more 
profitably used elsewhere. 
B. Performance Analysis following Value Line's Recommended 
Strategy 
In this section, we report the results from following Value Line's rec- 
ommended strategy of holding the option positions until the option 
ranks are no longer 1 or 2. We report two sets of results in order to 
evaluate the impact of the bid-ask spread. In the first set, the call 
options are assumed to be purchased and sold at the midpoint of the 
bid-ask spread. We then adopt the more realistic assumption that the 
call options are purchased at the ask price and sold at the bid price. 
In both cases, our daily hedge adjustments are made through stock 
transactions, and the call price used in determining the appropriate 
hedge ratio is the average of the bid and ask price. We emphasize that 
an actual Value Line subscriber is not advised to form hedge portfo- 
lios. This methodology is used only to isolate the components of the 
options' returns.6 
Panel A of table 3 contains the estimated means and standard devia- 
tions for the actual and model call returns and the call selectivity, 
the stock return, and the excess hedge return components. Without 
considering the effect of the bid-ask spread, the mean actual return is 
$1.064 per contract and the mean model return is -$0.315. This leads 
to a mean call selectivity component of $1.379 per contract per trading 
day, which is significant at .01. (Note that the call selectivity return is 
the actual return minus the model return.) The stock return component 
is positive and significant, which likely reflects the normal positive rate 
6. The hedge methodology has been used to decompose the actual return on a call 
option (see eq. [3]). The hedge is not riskless if the hedge slippage term, rj, exhibits 
systematic risk. The correlation between the hedge slippage measure and the return on 
the value-weighted Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) market portfolio was 
.01. However, there are obviously some individual hedges in which some systematic 
risk remains and even some cases where the hedge slippage could have negative correla- 
tion with the market portfolio. 
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Mon, 10 Nov 2014 14:04:05 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Value Line Enigma 555 
TABLE 3 Summary Statistics on Call and Stock Performance over Entire 
Holding Period 
R A Rm, RG, hRs, RXH 
A. Overall performance: 
Without bid-ask effects 1.064* -.315 1.379** 1.336** .894** 
(.517) (.516) (.193) (.514) (.193) 
With bid-ask effects .611 ... .927** ... .442* 
(.517) (.192) (.193) 
B. By call rank: 
Rank 1 (N = 18,682) 2.012** .230 1.782** 1.742** 1.369** 
(.648) (.644) (.249) (.642) (.248) 
Rank 2 (N = 10,350) -.577 -1.175 .598* .394 .152 
(.867) (.874) (.306) (.901) (.313) 
Rank 3 (N = 111) - 6.627 -9.412 2.785 - 3.698 - .676 
(7.508) (6.665) (3.584) (6.749) (3.557) 
C. By call and stock rank: 
Call rank 1: 
Stock rank 1 
(N = 10,245) 2.411** .745 1.666** 2.283* 1.239** 
(.905) (.909) (.358) (.902) (.357) 
Stock rank 2 
(N = 7,490) 1.432 -.285 1.718** 1.1154 1.355** 
(1.005) (.980) (.357) (.988) (.354) 
Stock rank 3 
(N = 923) 1.687 -2.043 3.734** -.284 3.093** 
(2.116) (2.113) (1.016) (2.120) (1.032) 
Call rank 2: 
Stock rank 1 
(N = 2,228) .811 .810 .002 2.758 -.548 
(1.935) (1.922) (.644) (1.863) (.674) 
Stock rank 2 
(N = 5,598) -.778 -1.313 .535 .230 .179 
(1.157) (1.173) (.410) (1.173) (.416) 
Stock rank 3 
(N = 2,491) -1.475 -2.757 1.282* -.989 .732 
(1.784) (1.802) (.646) (1.789) (.661) 
NOTE.-These statistics reflect mean returns and standard errors of the means from daily adjusted 
hedges for call options recommended by Value Line. Panel A presents the results for the entire 
sample assuming the hedge ratio is adjusted daily using the midpoint of the bid-ask spread. The 
results without bid-ask effects assume purchase and sale of the option at the midpoint of the bid-ask 
spread. The results with bid-ask effects assume purchase at the ask and sale at the bid. Panel B 
presents the results according to the call rank, and panel C presents the results by call and stock 
rank. The value RA is the return based on the actual call price, R' is the return based on the model 
call price, RGt is the call selectivity, hRst is the component of the option's return contributed by the 
stock, and RXHt is the excess hedge return. All figures are in dollars per contract. Standard errrors 
are in parentheses. Missing figures indicate that the figure is the same as the case listed directly 
above it. 
* Significant at the .05 level. 
** Significant at the .01 level. 
of return on stocks. We shall make an adjustment of the stock compo- 
nent for risk in Subsection F. The mean excess hedge return per con- 
tract is $0.894, which is significant at .01. 
The effect of the bid-ask spread was quite substantial. When the 
position is established at the ask and closed at the bid, the mean actual 
return is reduced by over 40%. The mean call selectivity component 
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is reduced by more than 30% and the mean excess hedge returns fall 
by over 50%. While both of these measures remain significant, it is 
clear that the bid-ask spread imposes a heavy burden. 
In addition to the cost of the bid-ask spread, traders face other 
costs. Phillips and Smith (1980) estimate the explicit transaction costs 
incurred by arbitrageurs, option market makers, and individual trad- 
ers. Floor trading and clearing costs are estimated to be $1.50 and 
$1.70 per option contract and $1.00 to $4.00 per round lot of stock for 
an arbitrageur, defined as a firm or individual with seats on both the 
options and stock exchanges. Blomeyer and Klemkosky (1983) assume 
mean trading and clearing costs of $1.60 per option contract and $2.50 
per round lot of stock. This implies round-trip floor trading and clearing 
costs of $8.20. Since the daily hedge adjustments are made in the 
stock, the appropriate adjustment is $4.10 for the first and last days of 
each holding period and $2.50 for each intermediate day. Even without 
considering bid-ask effects, these costs are sufficient to eliminate profit 
opportunities. 
C. Performance according to Option and Stock Ranks 
While all options considered in this study are initially ranked 1, their 
rankings may change over the course of the holding period. Ultimately, 
the holding period terminates when the rank falls below 2 or the option 
is no longer ranked. Thus, in the analysis performed in the previous 
section, the last trading day return involves an option having a rank 
of 3, 4, or 5 or an option that is unranked. In addition, over the course 
of the holding periods the ranking of the underlying stock may change. 
This section analyzes trading day returns by call rank and call and 
stock rank combinations and provides a direct test of the ranking 
system.7 
To facilitate comparisons between ranks, returns are calculated us- 
ing the average of the bid and ask prices. Panel B of table 3 presenfs 
the results by call rank. For rank 1 calls, the mean excess hedge return 
was $1.369 per contract per trading day, which is significant at .01. 
The mean actual trading day return on a naked call contract was 
$2.012, while the mean model call return was $0.230. This results in a 
mean call selectivity return of $1.782 per contract per trading day, 
which is significant at .01. Comparison of the average trading day 
return on a naked call contract to the call selectivity return indicates 
that a large portion of the naked call return is associated with the 
7. A caveat needs to be noted here. Since we are using observations from our holding 
periods, a subtle selection bias may be introduced. We cannot state definitely that any 
differential performance between rankings is associated solely with the ranking. The 
fact that the option has been recommended may also affect subsequent returns. We are 
grateful to the referee for bringing this to our attention. 
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convergence of the Value Line model price and the market quote price 
of the call. 
It is noteworthy that the excess hedge returns are aligned in magni- 
tude according to the ranks. As we would have expected based on the 
results in Subsection A, call selectivity is large and significant for rank 
1 calls. All returns measured in the week of purchase were for rank 1 
calls, and we found that significant convergence of model and observed 
call prices occurs during this week. While the rank 2 call selectivity is 
significantly positive, it is much smaller than that of rank 1. The rank 
3 call selectivity is quite high, but insignificant. Inspection of the data 
revealed that this average was influenced by two outliers whose re- 
moval would have resulted in a slightly negative call selectivity return. 
While this analysis has not considered brokerage commissions, inclu- 
sion of these costs would not alter the relative performance of the call 
options.8 
As described earlier, an integral component of the option ranking 
process is the rank of the underlying stock. The stock ranks ranged 
from 1 to 4 over the course of the holding periods, though at the 
recommendation date all stock ranks were 1, 2, or 3. Ceteris paribus, 
call ranks are positively related to the rank of the underlying stock. 
Thus, if a call option carries a high rank despite a relatively low stock 
rank, then Value Line must consider the call to be significantly under- 
valued. In turn, this suggests the hypothesis that the mean excess 
performance of hedges involving calls of a given rank on relatively 
lowly ranked stocks should exceed the performance of hedges involv- 
ing calls of equal rank on highly ranked stocks. We would also expect 
to observe a higher mean call selectivity component for calls of a given 
rank on relatively low ranked stocks. The presumption is that a high 
call rank on a relatively low ranked stock is associated with factors 
other than expectations of significant stock price performance and that 
the cardinal factor among these is the undervaluation of the call option. 
Panel C of table 3 presents the results from stratifying the sample 
according to call and stock rank. The evidence supports the hypothesis 
that a high call rank combined with a relatively low stock rank leads 
to the best performance. For calls ranked 1 there is a monotonic in- 
crease in both the mean excess hedge return and the mean call selectiv- 
ity as the stock rank declines from 1 to 3.9 Of course, from our earlier 
8. The average net investment in the hedge did not differ significantly or systemati- 
cally according to option rank. In addition, the correlation between actual net investment 
and excess hedge return was very low at - .01. We may safely conclude, therefore, that 
the difference in the magnitude of excess hedge returns is not due to differences in the 
dollar scale of the investment in the hedge and consequently to the transaction costs of 
brokerage commissions. 
9. For calls ranked 1 on stocks ranked 4, the mean excess hedge return was negative 
and insignificant. There were only 22 of these observations. 
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findings, we know that most of this difference occurs around the time 
of the recommendation. This suggests we should find much weaker 
evidence for calls ranked 2, and that is indeed the case. Although the 
averages line up as expected, none of the excess hedge returns were 
significant. However, the call selectivity for calls ranked 2 on stocks 
ranked 3 was marginally significant at the .05 level, suggesting that 
there may yet be some additional price adjustments while a call is still 
a recommended hold but the stock has a relatively low ranking. 
It is also interesting to note that the stock return component lines 
up appropriately with the stock rank, which is consistent with the 
findings of others that the Value Line stock ranks do have some dis- 
criminatory power. However, again, these have not yet been adjusted 
for risk. Indeed, Copeland and Mayers (1982) found that the higher 
ranked stocks did have higher betas, so these findings may actually 
reflect only a normal return. 
Table 4 presents results of tests of significance of the difference in 
mean excess hedge returns and call selectivity between call/stock rank 
combinations. There are twelve hypothesized relationships in which 
the expected sign of the difference is identifiable ex ante. The hypothe- 
ses may be summarized as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 1. For a given stock rank, abnormal call performance 
is larger the higher the call rank is. 
HYPOTHESIS 2. For a given call rank, abnormal call performance is 
larger the lower the stock rank is. 
HYPOTHESIS 3. For two given calls, abnormal performance is larger 
on the call having a higher call rank and lower stock rank. 
For these hypotheses, one-tailed matched pairs t-tests are appro- 
priate. As table 4 indicates, all twelve of the hypothesized relationships 
hold. For the excess hedge returns, the null hypothesis is rejected in 
7 of 12 cases at the .05 level and in four cases at the .01 level. For the 
call selectivity returns, the null hypothesis is rejected in eight cases at 
the .05 level and in three cases at the .01 level. If Value Line can 
identify mispriced options, we would expect that the largest difference 
would be observed when the call is ranked highest (1) and the stock 
is ranked relatively low (3) in comparison to the case where the call 
is ranked relatively low (2) and the stock ranked highest (1). The results 
are consistent with that hypothesis. 
D. Relative Call, Put, and Stock Prices around the 
Recommendation Dates 
As noted earlier, Value Line does not provide complete details on its 
procedure in assigning ranks and formulating recommendations. If the 
prevalent reason for call option recommendations is that Value Line 
believes that the market has underestimated future stock price volatil- 
ity, then we should observe simultaneous recommendations of put and 
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TABLE 4 Tests of Differences in Mean Performance according to Call/Stock 
Rank Combination 
Call/Stock 
Rank 
Combination 
Mean Mean 
Hypothesized Hypothesized Difference in Difference in 
Larger Smaller RXH, t RG, t 
1/3 1/1 1.854 1.70* 2.068 1.92* 
1/3 1/2 1.738 1.59 2.016 1.87* 
1/3 2/1 3.641 2.95** 3.731 3.10** 
1/3 2/2 2.914 2.62** 3.199 2.92** 
1/3 2/3 2.361 1.93* 2.452 2.04* 
1/2 1/1 .116 .23 .052 .10 
1/2 2/1 1.903 2.50** 1.716 2.33** 
1/2 2/2 1.176 2.15* 1.183 2.18* 
1/1 2/1 1.787 2.34** 1.663 2.26* 
2/2 2/1 .727 .92 .533 .70 
2/3 2/1 1.280 1.36 1.280 1.40 
2/3 2/2 .553 .71 .747 .98 
NOTE.-These statistics indicate the mean difference in excess hedge returns and call selectivity 
returns according to call rank/stock rank combination. The first column is the rank combination that 
is expected to exhibit higher abnormal call return performance under the hypothesis that Value Line 
is able to identify underpriced call options. Tests of the assumption of equal variances indicated that 
the variances were sufficiently unequal to warrant the use of an approximate t-statistic defined as t 
= (RXH,HL - RxH,Hs)I 1SXH,HL + SXH,HSInHS and similarly forRG,. The approximation for the degrees 
of freedom is 
df = (S2H,HLInHL + S2HHsIfnHs)2I[(S2HHLInHL)2I(nHL - 1) + (S2HHsInHs)2I(nHs - 1)], 
where the n's are the respective sample sizes. 
* Significant at the .05 level. 
** Significant at the .01 level. 
call options. To test this, we collected all put recommendations made 
during the 3-year period. For our sample of 495 call recommendations, 
there were only four stimultaneous put recommendations. This sug- 
gests that, in general, the basis for the recommendations is not a judg- 
ment that the market has underestimated future stock price volatility. 
Rather, for at least some of the recommended calls, Value Line must 
believe that call options are low priced relative to put options. In this 
section, we investigate the extent to which relative call, put, and stock 
prices correspond to option and stock rankings in the period immedi- 
ately before and after the recommendation date. 
All call options are ranked 1 on the recommendation date, but the 
underlying stocks may carry rankings of 1, 2, or 3. As described ear- 
lier, the lower the stock rank is, the more underpriced the call option 
is implicitly judged to be. To evaluate the extent to which calls are 
low-priced relative to puts and stock, we employ the put-call parity 
theorem for American options on dividend-paying stocks and a proce- 
dure similar to one used by Finucane (1991) and Figlewski and Webb 
(1993). In the case of known risk-free rates and up to three perfectly 
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forecasted dividends, these stock price boundary conditions apply: 
upper stock price boundary condition: 
S 5 CA - pB + PV(D) + K = UBt; 
lower stock price boundary condition: 
St 2 CB- pA + L = LBt. 
In the equations above, St, Ct, and Pt are the time t stock, call, 
and put prices, respectively, and B and A denote bid and ask prices, 
respectively; PV(D) is the present value of the dividends paid over the 
life of the options, and L is the minimum of the present value of the 
exercise price, K, the present value of the exercise price plus the 
present value of the first dividend, and so on through the last dividend 
paid over the option's life. While there is no theoretical location of the 
stock price within its upper and lower bounds, in cases where the 
observed stock price falls relatively close to the lower boundary, call 
options would be high-priced relative to puts and/or stock. Con- 
versely, if the observed stock price is relatively close to the upper 
boundary, call options are low-priced relative to puts and/or stock. 
In order to evaluate the behavior of relative call, put, and stock 
prices in the period surrounding the recommendation date, the follow- 
ing statistic is defined: 
St -LBt 
t UBt-LBt 
High (low) values of St indicate that call options are low (high) priced 
relative to puts and/or stock. 
For each recommended call option in our sample, we obtained a 
corresponding put and call quote pair for 5 trading days before and 10 
trading days after the recommendation date, as well as the recommen- 
dation date itself. To qualify, the put quote had to occur within 5 
minutes of the call quote, and each quote had to have the same associ- 
ated stock price. We then calculated the statistics S' for each observa- 
tion and computed means of the statistic separately for each event 
day and rank combination. Value Line assigns ranks on the Tuesday 
preceding the recommendation date, which corresponds to event day 
-4. Thus, to be consistent with the Value Line ranking system, the 
mean value of S' should be directly related to the numerical stock rank 
on event day - 4. The process of price adjustment should subsequently 
cause differences in the mean values of S' between rank combinations 
to disappear or become random. 
Figure 3 presents the mean values of S' by event day and rank 
combination. For each of the 5 trading days prior to the recommenda- 
tion' date, the relative price of the call is directly related to the stock 
rank. On the rank assignment day, - 4, there is a spike in the statistic 
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FIG. 3.-Relative put, call, and stock prices around recommendation date. 
The graph illustrates the average of the statistics S' for each call/stock rank 
combination centered around the recommendation date. Day 0 is the publica- 
tion day of the issue in which Value Line recommends the call. 
S' for the call/stock rank combination 1/3. The fact that these calls 
are relatively low priced in the context of the American put-call parity 
relationship is perfectly consistent with the assignment of a call rank 
of 1 and a stock rank of 3. The ordering according to stock rank per- 
sists until Thursday of the recommendation week, when the mean 
value of S' for the rank combination 1/3 dips below that of the rank 
combination 1/2. Beyond this point the ordering appears to become 
random. 
E. Some Additional Tests 
As a check on our results, we employed an alternative measure of 
abnormal call returns. Cox and Rubinstein (1985, p. 322) show that 
the call's expected percentage return can be expressed as a weighted 
average of the expected percentage return on the stock and the risk- 
free rate where the weight applied to the stock's return is the elasticity 
of the call. Since the elasticity requires only the option's delta and the 
option and stock prices, we can measure the call's expected return 
and use this in conjunction with the call's actual return to calculate an 
abnormal percentage call return. Applying this procedure, we obtained 
results that were in complete agreement with our previously reported 
findings for the call selectivity and excess hedge returns. 
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To examine the possible impact of outliers, we repeated the hedge 
decomposition tests excluding the top and bottom 1% of the excess 
hedge returns. Our primary conclusions remain robust. We also exam- 
ined the performance of the recommendations according to the mon- 
eyness of the calls, the time to expiration, and the volatility of the 
underlying stock. The results do not provide strong evidence that any 
of these characteristics affect performance. At-the-money calls tended 
to be slightly less mispriced, intermediate- and longer-term calls were 
slightly more mispriced, and volatility was unrelated to performance. 
In order to determine whether the reported results are methodology- 
dependent, we constructed a control sample of options. For each op- 
tion in the Value Line sample, the procedure was as follows. First, 
we collected all quotes on the recommendation date for options that 
had the same expiration date and for which the absolute value of the 
ratio of stock price to exercise price was within .02 of the ratio for the 
corresponding Value Line sample option. We then eliminated duplicate 
options and evaluated the last recorded quotes for each of these op- 
tions on the preceding Tuesday, which is Value Line's analysis date. 
The observed stock price and option ask price on this date were used 
to calculate an implied volatility and this was used to generate a series 
of seven option prices for stock prices centered around Tuesday's 
recorded stock price. These stock and call prices correspond to the 
limit prices provided by the Value Line recommendations. Using these 
prices, the options were screened for purchase on the associated rec- 
ommendation date in the same way as the Value Line sample. In many 
cases, more than one option per Value Line sample option was execut- 
able by Friday of the recommendation week. In such cases, we re- 
tained the option whose moneyness ratio was closest to that of the 
Value Line sample option. It was then necessary to estimate model 
prices for the options in the control sample. This was accomplished 
by observing the percentage premium of the model price above the' 
quote price for each Value Line sample option on the execution date 
and applying this same premium to the corresponding control sample 
option. We then used the model price and the stock price on the execu- 
tion date to calculate an implied standard deviation for each of the 
control sample options. This volatility estimate was then used through- 
out the event period to calculate model prices for the control sample. 
The important issue is whether the pattern of call selectivity for the 
control sample is similar to that observed for the Value Line sample. 
If so, we would conclude that the methodology is generating the re- 
sults.10 Our results, however, indicate a distinctly different pattern for 
the two samples. While we observe a large positive value for RG, for 
10. This could result, for example, if our screening procedure systematically selects 
quotes on day 0 that are in error. 
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the Value Line sample on the first day of the holding period, the statis- 
tic for the control sample is much smaller and insignificant on this day. 
In contrast to the Value Line sample, where four of the call selectivity 
returns are significantly positive over the first 10 days of the holding 
period, none of the values of RG, are significant over this period for 
the control sample. Both samples yield negative values of RG, on day 
0, which indicates an increase in the difference between the model and 
quote price. This is attributable to the screening procedure employed 
in which we select only those options satisfying the limit price. The 
critical difference is that the day 0 gap between model and actual quote 
price for the sample endures throughout the holding period, while for 
the Value Line sample the prices converge. These results do not sup- 
port the notion that the results are methodology dependent. 
We examined an alternative strategy, consisting of buying the call 
when initially recommended and selling it when it was downgraded to 
a rank of 2 or below. These tests omit cases where a call was down- 
graded and then upgraded back to a 1 and calls still held at the end of 
the sample period. These results included the full impact of the bid-ask 
spread. The findings revealed that the positive benefit of trading only 
rank 1 calls is still offset by the weight of the bid-ask spread and no 
abnormal returns after transaction costs can be earned. 
Finally, we examined two filter rules, one involving the execution 
of trades when the limit price exceeded the ask price by at least $0.25 
and the other involving trades when the limit price exceeded the ask 
price by at least 15%. As would be expected, both rules produced 
improved results with the 15% filter being the better rule. However, the 
improvements were not sufficient to cover explicit transaction costs. 
F. The Adjustment of hRst for Risk 
So far we have generated a number of statistics on hRs,, the component 
of the option's return that is accounted for by the stock. This figure is 
a dollar amount and is not adjusted for risk. A risk adjustment, such 
as subtracting a risk premium based on the capital asset pricing model, 
would be difficult for several reasons. The stock returns are measured 
at different points during a trade day, based on when the first option 
transaction after 10:00 A.M. occurred. It would be necessary to con- 
struct or have available tick-by-tick data on the stocks' prices plus the 
market index to match simultaneously with the hRst returns. As an 
alternative, we estimated the daily stock excess returns from the file 
of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). These returns 
would match according to the day but would run from close-to-close 
while the hRst series would run from the first call transaction after 
10:00 A.M. on one day to the first call transaction after 10:00 A.M. on 
the next day. However, the CRSP returns should suffice for our pur- 
poses since we simply wish to determine if the excess stock returns 
over the option holding periods were significant. 
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Abnormal percentage stock returns were calculated in the following 
manner. For each call option, C, in the sample, the market model 
parameters, ?cs, and I3cs, were estimated for the underlying stock, S, 
over the 250 trading days following the end of the holding period for 
the option.11 The abnormal stock return for day t, ARcs,, was then 
computed as rs - [cs + oCSrMt], where rs and rM, are the actual day 
t percentage returns on stock S and on the CRSP value-weighted port- 
folio of New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange 
stocks, respectively. Note that there may be multiple options on a 
given day t that are written on the same stock and, unless the holding 
periods of these options terminate on the same day, the market model 
parameters used in calculating expected returns will be estimated over 
different periods. It is, therefore, necessary to determine an average 
abnormal return for each stock for each day t. The average percentage 
abnormal return for stock S on day t is defined as ARst = (1/N) 
,c I [ARcst], where N is the number of call options in the sample 
written on stock S on day t. We wish to test the abnormal return 
performance of stocks along two dimensions: (1) according to the rank 
of the stock and (2) according to the call/stock rank combination. In 
order to develop an average daily abnormal return for stocks of a given 
rank K, the arithmetic average of ARst across all trading days and 
stocks having rank K is calculated and is denoted ARK. The average 
daily abnormal return for stocks having rank K and on which there 
are options having rank L is calculated similarly and denoted ARKL. 
Our results, not shown here, revealed that the mean excess stock 
return over the option holding period was not significant for any of the 
stock rank groups or combined call rank/stock rank combinations. 
This result is not necessarily inconsistent with previous studies that 
showed Value Line's superior ability to recommend stocks. Our tests 
consisted of calls on stocks ranked 1, 2, 3, or 4. There were no cases 
where the stock was ranked 5. Copeland and Mayers (1982) found 
abnormal performance only on stocks ranked 5. Moreover, their per- 
formance was measured over a period of 26 weeks after the stock had 
been given a specific rank. The evidence in their table 4 shows a clear 
11. In developing timeliness rankings for common stocks, Value Line considers recent 
relative stock price performance. Stocks that perform unusually positively relative to 
the overall market are assigned higher rankings, ceteris paribus, than stocks that un- 
derperform the market. Thus, for highly ranked stocks, beta estimation during the period 
over which the stock exhibited positive relative price performance would lead to an 
upward bias in the calculated beta. Using this beta estimate during the test period to 
determine if there is an association between positive excess return performance and 
stock rankings results in an overstatement of the benchmark return and a bias against 
the finding of positive abnormal performance. For low-ranked stocks the reverse is true. 
The benchmark return is understated, and there is a bias against the finding of negative 
abnormal return performance. The use of a future period for the calculation of bench- 
mark returns overcomes this problem. See Copeland and Mayers (1982). 
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and logical tendency for the most significant performance to occur 
shortly after the date on which the rank was assigned. This was con- 
firmed by Stickel's (1985) results, which suggest that most of the re- 
sponse to a rank change occurs within a week. Our stock returns are 
measured over a period corresponding to the recommended option 
holding period. Since we do not have the necessary data, we are unable 
to determine whether the stock rank is reassigned at the time of the 
option recommendation. However, the beginning of the option holding 
period will not necessarily correspond to the reassignment of a stock 
rank. 
Another interesting and related question is whether there is any 
abnormal performance in the underlying stocks prior to the release of 
the recommendation to purchase the call. To examine this issue, we 
estimated the market model parameters over a 250-trading-day period 
beginning 250 days after the option is purchased. Since the longest 
holding period was 189 calendar days, the future benchmark period 
would not overlap with any option holding period. We also used an 
historical benchmark period and achieved similar results. Then we 
estimated excess returns on the securities for a period of 60 days prior 
to the purchase date to 60 days after the purchase date.12 
Cumulative average residuals are shown for the period of day - 60 
to day + 60 in Figure 4. Several interesting results are revealed. The 
residuals are positive and rising for the period prior to day 0. This 
result is not surprising since Value Line is known to pay attention to 
the recent performance of the stock. On day 0, the average residual is 
0.37% and has a t-statistic of 4.54. This is the largest average residual 
and t-statistic over the entire 121-day period. Combined with our ear- 
lier result, it is apparent that the stock price rises sharply, and the 
option mispricing is very large on the day the holding period begins. 
Of course, we must be careful not to link these two findings too tightly. 
The option return is measured from approximately 11:00 A.M. on the 
day it is purchased to approximately 11:00 A.M. the next day. The 
stock return is measured from the close on the day before the call is 
purchased until the close of the day the call is purchased. In addition, 
there is the possibility that for some options, the purchase date corre- 
sponds to the date of a stock rank change. Since we do not have data 
on the stock ranks prior to the date the option is recommended, we 
cannot address this question. However, our findings of significant posi- 
tive cumulative average residuals prior to the date the option is pur- 
chased confirms that call options are recommended on stocks that 
show favorable performance. 
12. Recall that the first day of the holding period does not necessarily correspond to 
the date of the publication of the recommendation. Fifty-eight percent of the options 
that could be bought for less than Value Line's limit price were bought on Monday. 
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Mon, 10 Nov 2014 14:04:05 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
566 Journal of Business 
0.05 
0.04 ------ 
0.03 ----- 
0.02 - ---------- - -------------- 
0.01 
-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 
Day 
FIG. 4.-Cumulative average residuals of stocks on which Value Line rec- 
ommends purchases of the call option on day 0. Market model parameters 
were estimated using a 250-day benchmark period beginning 250 days from 
day 0. 
Figure 5 shows the cumulative average residuals for an event analy- 
sis in which day 0 is the day on which Value Line Options lowers the 
call's rank to 3 or below and, thus, is the end of the holding period. 
Significant negative average residuals of -0.39%, -0.52%, and 
- 0.21% were observed on days - 7, - 6, - 5, and - 4. Day - 4 is the 
day on which Value Line performs the analysis that downgrades the 
call. Thus, it appears that Value Line observes significant abnormal 
negative performance on the stock and then lowers the call's rank. 
This result is consistent with our first reported finding. Recall that we 
found that Value Line's recommendations to purchase calls revealed 
abnormal performance that quickly dissipated. There is little evidence 
that abnormal performance is earned by holding on to one's position 
until Value Line gives its sell recommendation, which appears to be 
triggered by a sharp stock price move. Thus, Value Line seems to 
have the ability to recommend when to open the position but not when 
to close it. 
V. Conclusions 
This research examines call option rankings and recommendations ap- 
pearing in Value Line Options over the period 1983-85. The objectives 
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FIG. 5.-Cumulative average residuals of the stocks on which Value Line 
lowers the rank of the call option to 3 or below on day 0. Market model 
parameters were estimated using a 250-day benchmark period beginning 250 
days from day 0. 
of this research are to (1) determine whether there is information in 
Value Line's option rankings and recommendations and to (2) deter- 
mine whether an investor following Value Line's option recommenda- 
tions and prescribed strategy earns abnormal returns. 
We find evidence of abnormal call returns in the period immediately 
following the recommended option purchase date, which is consistent 
with the results of Value Line Investment Survey stock ranking studies. 
An analysis of performance according to call rank and combined call 
and stock rank also supports the notion that Value Line rankings have 
information content. Abnormal returns were significantly positive for 
calls ranked 1. The largest and most significant abnormal call return 
performance was exhibited by calls ranked 1 written on stocks whose 
rank indicated that the stock was correctly priced. Hypothesis tests of 
differences in abnormal call performance among different call and 
stock rank combinations strongly support the ability of Value Line's 
rankings to discriminate ex ante the performance of call options. 
Value Line's prescribed strategy of buying call options and holding 
them until they are no longer ranked 1 or 2 was found to yield signifi- 
cantly positive abnormal returns before consideration of explicit trans- 
actions costs. After consideration of floor trading and clearing costs, 
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however, the strategy of forming riskless hedge portfolios and rebal- 
ancing on a daily basis does not generate excess returns. Thus, we do 
not find evidence against market efficiency. 
An analysis of Value Line's put recommendations indicated that 
only four of the 495 calls in our sample had simultaneous put recom- 
mendations. This suggests that, in general, Value Line is not basing 
its recommendations on judgments that the market has underestimated 
future stock price volatility. Rather, Value Line must believe that call 
options are low priced relative to put options and/or the underlying 
stock. We employed the American put-call parity relationship to inves- 
tigate the extent to which call and stock rankings correspond to relative 
call, put and stock prices. Our results are consistent with a ranking 
system based on relative call, put, and stock prices in the week prior 
to the recommendation date. 
The findings of this study further confirm Value Line's ability to ex 
ante separate winners from losers. While we have not been able to 
identify the specific procedure behind Value Line's recommendations, 
we are relatively confident that it is based on perceived mispricing 
of calls and is not simply a leveraging of its stock recommendation 
performance or the market's misestimation of the stock's volatility. 
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